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PARTIES
All of the parties involved appear in the caption of the case.

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has invested this Court with jurisdiction
of this matter by virtue of its Order dated July 8, 1978 (reproduced infra at
A-5) pursuant to its "pourover" authority.

NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court modifying
the District Court's prior judgment in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellants George M.
Baker and his mother, Delia A. Baker (hereinafter "the Bakers"). The case in

the District Court was a civil action by the Bakers against a defaulting and
defunct auto dealer (Defendant Craig A. Papa-Dakis) and the surety on his
motor vehicle dealer's bond, Defendant-Respondent Western Surety Company.

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Was Respondent Western Surety's motion (dated February 6,

1987) to modify the December, 1986, judgment of the District Court timely?
2. Did the District Court have jurisdiction to modify its December,
1986, judgment while that judgment was on appeal by Western Surety to the
Utah Supreme Court?
3.

In view of the fact that Respondent Western Surety approved

the December, 1986, judgment as to form, was it proper for the District Court
to grant Western Surety's later motion to modify that judgment on the basis
of mistake?
4. Was the District Court's December, 1986, judgment void?
5.

Was it proper for the District Court to limit Appellants'

execution on their December, 1986, judgment against Western Surety "to the
bond?"
6.

Is Western Surety's cross-appeal barred by the Utah Supreme

Court's dismissal of its prior appeal?
7. Was Western Surety's cross-appeal timely filed?

2

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (reproduced infra
at A-3) provides that "clerical mistakes" in a final judgment may be corrected
after an appeal is docketed in the appellate court only

M

with leave of the

appellate court.M
Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (reproduced infra
at A-2) requires that motions pursuant to Rule 59 must be filed within ten
(10) days following the entry of the judgment.
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (reproduced
infra at A-4) requires that an appeal be filed within thirty days from the
entry of the challenged order.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a fundamentally simple action involving a defaulting motor
vehicle dealer and his surety, which has been unconscionably complicated and
protracted by the surety's persistent procedural efforts to avoid paying the
judgment entered against it even though it has never challenged the ultimate
merit of that judgment.

Western Surety issued a motor vehicle dealer's bond

to Defendant Craig Papa-Dakis.

(Answer, Para. 6, R. at 27.)

This bond1

allowed Defendant Papa-Dakis to operate as a motor vehicle dealer within the
state of Utah.
The Bakers paid approximately $15,000.00 in cash for a vehicle for
Mrs. Baker.

(R. at 3.)

Mrs. Baker, who is elderly, could not operate the

*The bond is reproduced in the Addendum, infra at A-14.
3

parking brake of the vehicle and Defendant Papa-Dakis agreed to replace the
vehicle with another comparable vehicle of her choosing.

(R. at 62.)

The

Bakers returned the first vehicle and were promised a replacement.

The

replacement vehicle was not forthcoming and, under pressure from the Bakers,
Defendant Papa-Dakis' employees provided a temporary loaner.

Ultimately,

the Bakers were compelled by the rightful owners of the loaner to return
that vehicle and have never been provided with either the title to the
original vehicle or a refund of the purchase price.

(R. at 63.)

Defendant

Papa-Dakis is now out of business and facing numerous criminal charges.
Plaintiffs made claim upon Western Surety Company under its motor
vehicle dealer's bond. Western Surety ignored that claim. Plaintiffs filed suit
against Mr. Papa-Dakis and Western Surety, as his surety.

(R. at 2.)

On

November 5, 1986, the District Court entered judgment against Defendant
Papa-Dakis. (R. at 37-38, reproduced infra at A-6.)
Western Surety still refused to pay the Bakers' claim under its
bond.

On December 4, 1986, the Bakers filed their Motion for Summary

Judgment against Western Surety.

(R. at 43.)

Western Surety responded by

filing an interpleader action in the District Court2 and filing a motion in the
Bakers' action to stay that action. (R. at 68.) Both motions were heard by
Judge Wilkinson on December 19, 1986. (R. at 86.) Judge Wilkinson denied
Western Surety's motion to stay proceedings and granted the Bakers' Motion
for Summary Judgment. (Transcript of 12/19/86 Hearing, R. at 312.) Upon

2

The interpleader action was assigned to the Honorable Richard Moffat,
whereas the Bakers' action was assigned to the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson.
4

the announcement by Judge Wilkinson of his grant of the Bakers' Motion for
Summary Judgment, Western Surety's Counsel orally moved to stay execution
upon that judgment.

(Transcript of 12/19/86 Hearing, R. at 325.)

Judge

Wilkinson denied that motion also. (Id.)
Ten days later, on December 29, 1986, Western Surety paid to the
Clerk of the District Court the sum of $20,000.00, the amount that it claims3
represents the total amount of its indebtedness under its bond. (See. Clerk's
receipt, R. at 182, reproduced infra at A-15.)
Under pressure from the Utah State Insurance Commissioner (see
letter dated 1/27/87, reproduced infra at A-16-17), Western Surety filed with
the Utah Supreme Court a notice of its appeal of the District Court's denial
of its

motion to

R. at 153.)

stay the Bakers' action.

(See, Notice of Appeal,

Western Surety made clear that it did not appeal the Summary

Judgment for only the denial of a stay. (Id.)
Judge Wilkinson having twice denied Western Surety's motion for a
stay and Western Surety having appealed that denial to the Utah Supreme
Court, Western Surety then obtained ex parte from the Honorable David B.
Dee (acting for the Honorable Richard H. Moffat) a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining the Bakers from executing upon the judgment that Judge
Wilkinson had granted them.4 At a hearing held on February 5, 1987, Judge
3

There are numerous claimants with respect to the conduct of Defendant
Papa-Dakis. Western Surety's claim that its liability is limited to $20,000.00
for all claims combined is debatable under the Utah Supreme Court's decision
in Dennis Dillion Oldsmobile, Inc.t v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557 (Utah 1983).
4

That TRO was improperly obtained in violation of a number of
provisions, including: Section 78-7-19 of the Utah Code (prohibiting repeated
applications for the same order); Rule 15.4 of the Rules of Practice; Rule
5

Moffat vacated the TRO as having been "wrongfully issued" and denied
Western Surety's concurrent motion for a preliminary injunction.
of 2/5/87 Hearing at 39, reproduced infra at A-24.)

(Transcript

Following the hearing

before Judge Moffat, counsel for Western Surety and the Bakers agreed to the
amount and sufficiency of a supersedeas bond to be posted by Western Surety
pending the resolution of its appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.

Based upon

the assurances of counsel for Western Surety that a corporate surety bond
was being obtained and would be posted, counsel for the Bakers agreed that
no further efforts at execution would be attempted even before the bond was
actually posted. (See, Stipulation, R. at 269-70, reproduced infra at A-25.)
Thereafter, Western Surety filed

with Judge Wilkinson in the

Bakers' action its "Motion for Relief from Judgment or, in the Alternative, to
Limit Execution to the Interpleaded Funds." (R. at 161-165, reproduced infra
at A-27.)

That motion sought relief under Rule 60(a) and alleged that the

December, 1986, judgment was Hin error, as the [Bakers'] judgment should be
limited to a judgment against the bond."
through A-29.)

(R. at 162-163 and infra at A-28

The motion also sought relief under Rule 60(b)(1), alleging

that the December, 1986, judgment did not "accurately reflect the result of
the summary judgment entered." (R. at 163 and infra at A-29.)

Finally, the

motion sought an order limiting execution "to the bond funds" (R. at 164 and
infra at A-30.)
Western Surety's appeal of

Judge Wilkinson's December,

1986,

65A(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (in that it did not define the
injury, did not state why the injury was irreparable, and did not state why it
had been granted without notice); and Rule 65A(c) (in that no security was
posted).
6

judgment was docketed with the Utah Supreme Court on February 11, 1987.
Thereafter, Western Surety's motion was argued to Judge Wilkinson on
February 13, 1987.

Judge Wilkinson noted that he had "serious — very

serious -- question" as to whether he had jurisdiction in view of the fact
that Western Surety had appealed his original denial of a stay to the Utah
Supreme Court (Transcript of 2/13/87 Hearing, R. at 280 and 281, reproduced
infra at A-31 and A-32) but, nevertheless, granted the motion, noting that his
December, 1986, judgment should "only go against the bond."

(Id. at 282.)

Judge Wilkinson also stated that he felt that the Bakers were "entitled to
judgment against the amount of the bond of Western Surety or the bond
itself."

(Id at 283-84.)

He went on to note that he thought "the judgment

itself is void" (Id. at 284) and that he was granting the relief pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(5). {Id.)
On March 26, 1987, the Utah Supreme Court, upon the stipulation
of the parties and upon the motion of Western Surety, dismissed in its
entirety Western Surety's appeal from Judge Wilkinson's December, 1986,
judgment.

(See, Order, reproduced infra at A-20.)

On April 7, 1987, the

District Court entered its formal written Order on Western Surety's motion to
limit execution, the sole effect of which was to grant Western Surety's
motion to amend the original December 31, 1986, Judgment so as to limit
Western Surety's liability "to the bond."

(R. at 294-96, reproduced infra at

A-ll.)
The Bakers appealed to the Utah Supreme Court solely from the
granting of Western Surety's motion to modify the original judgment so as to
limit execution "to the bond."

(See, Notice of
7

Appeal, R. at 300-01,

reproduced infra at A-22.)

Western Surety now attempts to cross-appeal the

District Court's denial (more than four months earlier in December, 1986) of
its motion for a stay. (R. at 304-05.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The District Court erred in attempting to amend in April of 1987
the judgment that it had entered in favor of the Bakers against Western
Surety in December of

1986.

Procedurally, the District Court lacked

jurisdiction to order amendment of its December judgment. Jurisdiction must
be found in Rule 60(a), 60(b), or 59. The District Court lacked jurisdiction
under Rule 60(a) because Western Surety's appeal of the December, 1986,
judgment had been docketed with the Utah Supreme Court but no leave had
been obtained from the Utah Supreme Court for the modification of the
judgment sought by Western Surety. The trial court attempted to justify the
relief under Rule 60(b)(5) on the basis that the judgment was "void." Even if
erroneous, however, the judgment would be merely voidable, not void.
Moreover, grounds do not exist on the basis of "mistake" under Rule 60(b)(1).
Finally, the relief that the motion actually sought was an amendment of the
judgment pursuant to Rule 59; however, any motion under that rule had to be
filed within ten days and the motion was, therefore, untimely.
Substantively, there is no merit to Western Surety's contention that
its liability to the Bakers should be limited Mto its bond.11 A bond is merely a
civil contract which, in this case, Western Surety breached. There exists no
justification to limit a defaulting party's liability to the very contract that
the party has breached.
8

Western Surety's cross-appeal must be dismissed because it is
barred.

Western Surety's cross-appeal relates only to the denial in December

of 1986 of its motion to stay the proceedings.

The order implementing that

denial was entered December 31, 1986, together with the original Judgment.
The subsequent amendment, in April of

1986, of the Judgment entered

concurrently with the denial of Western Surety's motion for a stay does not
extend the appeal time with respect to that order.

Accordingly, Western

Surety's cross-appeal is untimely even if not barred by the dismissal of its
prior appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT L THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO AMEND THE
JUDGMENT.
Any action by the trial court to amend its December, 1986,
judgment had to fall within the purview of one of three possible rules of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 59, Rule 60(a), or Rule 60(b).

As will

be seen, none of those rules was applicable and the trial court lacked
jurisdiction.

A. The Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction Under Rule 60(a).
Western Surety claims that the trial court was acting under Rule
60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule5 relates only to

6

The rule is set forth in full in the Addendum, infra at A-3
9

"clerical mistakes in judgments . . . arising from oversight or omission . . . ,M
and provides that:
During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be
so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the
appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is
pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate
court.
Rule 60(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

In this case, Western Surety's

appeal of Judge Wilkinson's December, 1986, judgment was docketed on
February 11, 1987. Leave was never sought of, and leave was never granted
by, the Utah Supreme Court for any amendment or correction of the record
or the judgment by the District Court.

Accordingly, when the motion of

Western Surety was heard by Judge Wilkinson on February 13, 1987, Judge
Wilkinson, as he recognized6, lacked jurisdiction of the case.

The language

of Rule 60(a) is clear. If the correction of clerical errors is to be conducted
after the filing of an appeal, it must be conducted either before the appeal is
docketed or with leave of the appellate court.

In this case, neither of the

conditions was met and the District Court lacked jurisdiction to amend its
December, 1986, judgment.
Moreover, counsel for Western Surety reviewed the December, 1986,
judgment prior to its entry and signed that judgment as "approved as to
form" before it was submitted to Judge Wilkinson for entry.
R. at 100-02, reproduced infra at A-8.)

(See, Judgment,

Having previously approved of the

form of the judgment, it was totally inappropriate for Western Surety to later
complain about the form of that judgment and allege clerical errors in it.
e

See Transcript of 2/13/87 Hearing, R. at 280-81, reproduced infra at
A-31 and A-32.
10

Having approved of the form of the judgment, Western Surety was precluded
from later claiming "clerical errors/1
Both because the trial court lacked jurisdiction under the express
language of Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and because its
counsel had approved of the form of the judgment later claimed to contain
clerical errors, the District Court erred in attempting to amend the December,
1986, judgment.
B. No Grounds Existed for Relief Under Rule 60(b^.
At the hearing at which he granted Western Surety's motion to
amend the December, 1986, judgment, Judge Wilkinson stated that he felt the
original judgment was void. (See, R. at 284, reproduced infra at A-35.) This
statement manifests a clear misunderstanding of relevant law by the trial
judge.

A judgment which is erroneous may, under some circumstances, be

voidable, but it is not void.

A judgment is void only if it was entered by a

court not having jurisdiction of the subject matter or in an action in which
the persons against whom the judgment is signed have not been served or
otherwise brought within the court's in personam jurisdiction.

In this case, it

is beyond any argument that Western Surety was properly served and that the
District Courts of this state have jurisdiction in matters of this nature.
There is simply no merit of any nature whatsoever to Judge Wilkinson's belief
that the December 31, 1986, judgment resulting from the December 19, 1986,
hearing, was "void."
Western Surety also attempts to bring Judge Wilkinson's order
within the purview of Subsection 1 of Rule 60(b), which relates to "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" as grounds for relief.
11

This

section also is not applicable to the present circumstances.
no evidence offered to support any relief under this ground.

First, there was
There were no

affidavits filed and there were no witnesses called. Moreover, Western Surety
had every opportunity to detect and correct any "mistake" in the December,
1986, judgment; yet, it approved that judgment as to form after several
changes were made at its request.

Having had an opportunity to inspect and

redraft the judgment and having approved the judgment as to form, Western
Surety was precluded from later claiming that the judgment contained some
"mistake."

With respect to "inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," no

evidence was offered and no argument was made to Judge Wilkinson.

Those

concepts are not applicable to the circumstances of this case.

C. Western Surety's Motion Actually Sought an Amendment of the December,
1986. Judgment and Was Untimely Under Rule 59.
The thrust of Western Surety's complaint was with the substance of
the December, 1986, judgment, rather than its form.

The motion that Western

Surety really argued to the District Court was a Rule 59 motion to alter or
amend the December judgment.
In essence, Western Surety's argument was that since the Bakers'
claim was "on the bond," their judgment should have been "limited to the
bond."

Assuming, arguendo, the legal validity of

this argument, it is

immediately apparent that what is being contended is that an error had
occurred in the substance of the judgment in that the relief granted was
erroneous and more generous than should have been allowed.
falls under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
12

Such a motion

Rule 59(e), however, strictly limits the filing of motions under
Rule 59 to the ten-day period following the entry of the judgment.

The

judgment that Western Surety sought to have amended was entered on
December 31, 1986. Accordingly, its motion on February 6, 1987, was clearly
untimely.

The District Court erred in failing to deny an untimely Rule 59

motion.

POINT IL THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIVE MERIT TO THE CONTENTION
THAT PLAINTIFFS' JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO
DEFENDANT'S BOND.
A fundamental point must be made at the outset:

A bond is

nothing but a civil contract, an agreement by one party to make payment if a
stated condition occurs or fails to occur.

In this case, Western Surety

entered into a contract by which it agreed to pay up to a stated amount in
the event that the auto dealer failed to comply with Utah law.7

Western

Surety received substantial financial compensation for making that promise.
Accordingly, Western Surety was obligated to honor the Bakers' claim when it
became

apparent

obligations to them.

that

co-Defendant

Papa-Dakis

had

defaulted

in

his

Western Surety failed to pay the Bakers, ignoring their

7

Actually, the bond contains two separate and distinct promises by
Western Surety. First, Western Surety expressly agreed to "indemnify persons
. . . for loss suffered . . . through the violation of any of the provisions of
[Utah's] Motor Vehicle Business Act . . . ." Second, Western Surety expressly
agreed that it would "pay judgments and costs adjudged against [its] principal
. . . on account of fraud or fraudulent representations or for any violation or
violations of said laws . . . .H It additionally agreed that it would Halso pay
reasonable attorney's fees in cases successfully prosecuted to judgment.M The
bond is reproduced in the Addendum, infra at A-14.
13

claim.

Once judgment was entered against co-Defendant Papa-Dakis on

November 5, 1986 (R. at 37-38, reproduced infra at A-6), Western Surety was
expressly obligated under the provisions of its bond to pay that judgment.
Western Surety still refused to pay. Western Surety was, therefore, in breach
of its contract.
On December 4, 1986, the Bakers filed their Motion for Summary
Judgment.

(R. at 43.)

that their existed

On December 19, 1986, Judge Wilkinson determined

no genuine dispute as to any fact

material

to the

determination of the motion for summary judgment and granted the Bakers
Summary Judgment based upon those undisputed facts (R. at 325).

Nothing

contained in the motion, nothing contained in Western Surety's response, and
nothing contained in the arguments of counsel before Judge Wilkinson can be
said to stand for the proposition that the motion was anything but a routine
motion for summary judgment based upon a contractual obligation that had
clearly been breached by Western Surety.

The court agreed and granted

Summary Judgment.
Under such circumstances, Western Surety simply breached its
contractual obligations to the Bakers.

Having breached those obligations,

there exists no justification for limiting the Bakers' recovery upon their
judgment "to the bond."

The "bondH is, after all, nothing but a civil

contract, which has, in this case, been breached by Western Surety.

It makes

no more sense in this case for Western Surety to argue that its liability or
that the Bakers* execution, should be limited "to the bond funds" than it
would in any other contract case to say that the Plaintiff, who has recovered
judgment based upon the Defendant's breach of contract, must look solely to
14

the breached contract for recovery.

Had Western Surety chosen to comply

with its contractual obligation under the bond, then its liability to the
Plaintiffs would undoubtedly have been limited in accordance with the terms
of the bond.

However, Western Surety, for whatever reason, chose to

disregard its obligations under the bond, chose to refuse to pay the Bakers'
claim, and cannot now insist that the Court limit its liability to the very
contractual document that it breached.
Significantly, Western Surety cited not a single case to the District
court in which a court had "limited execution to the bond." While the phrase
has a certain equitable ring about it, there is no legal support for the
concept.
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial court may
not indefinitely stay execution upon its judgment, which is precisely the relief
that Western Surety obtained from the District Court in this case.
example,

in

Taylor

National

Inc.,

v.

Jensen

For

Brothers Construction*

641 P.2d 150 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court reversed an attempt by the
trial court to limit execution upon its judgment, noting:
Having found that a valid contract existed and that
[Plaintiff] had performed its part of that contract, the
Court correctly granted judgment to [Plaintiff] on the
contract.

While the trial court was correct in awarding
judgment to [Plaintiff] it erred in permanently staying
execution of that judgment against [one of the
defendants]. A party receiving a judgment is entitled to
have that judgment enforced by the granting court.
That court, in its discretion, may temporarily stay

15

execution in order to prevent injustice, but it may not
negate its own judgment by indefinitely staying execution
thereon.
641 P.2d at 153-54 (emphasis added, footnote citations omitted). Similarly, in
Ketchum Cole v. Christensen, 48 Utah 214, 159 Pac. 541 (1916), the Utah
Supreme Court held that there is "no discretion . . . vested in the court
whether it will enforce" its judgments.

Simply stated, the District Court did

not have the discretion to grant the relief sought by Western Surety under
the facts of this case.
It should be noted that the dilemma that Western Surety perceives
itself to be faced with is entirely of its own making.

Western Surety's

concern is that there are numerous individuals who were defrauded by
Western Surety's principal.

The Bakers, however, perfected their claim under

the bond by giving notice and making their claim.

They then proceeded to

file suit against the auto dealer and recover judgment against the dealer.
They then moved for summary judgment against Western Surety.

At that

point, rather than honoring their claim, Western Surety filed an interpleader
action

naming

the

Bakers and

several

other

claimants

as

E>efendants.

However, that action was not served on the Bakers and no funds were
actually deposited by Western Surety with respect to the interpleader action
until long after Judge Wilkinson had granted Summary Judgment against
Western Surety on December 19, 1986.

Having been told on December 19,

1986, by Judge Wilkinson that he was granting Summary Judgment in favor of
the Bakers, Western Surety elected to voluntarily pay the $20,000.00 that it

16

claims to be the maximum amount due under its bond8 to the Clerk of the
District Court in the interpleader action on December 29, 1986, rather than
using those funds to satisfy the Bakers' claims and judgment against Western
Surety.

Having voluntarily elected to place those funds beyond the reach of

the Bakers, Western Surety now fears that unless the Bakers' execution is
limited to those funds, Western Surety may possibly be faced with a "double
liability." Western Surety should not, however, be permitted to foist upon the
Bakers the burden of the quandary that it created for itself by voluntarily
paying funds to the interpleader action rather than using those funds to
satisfy the judgment that had already been rendered against it in favor of the
Bakers.

POINT III. WESTERN SURETY'S CROSS-APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED.

A.

The Cross-Appeal Is Barred by the Prior Dismissal of Western Surety's

Appeal.
On January 29, 1987, Western Surety appealed to the Utah Supreme
Court from the District Court's denial of its motion to stay proceedings.
(Notice of Appeal, R. at 153-54, reproduced infra at A-18.)

Pursuant to a

stipulation of the parties and upon the motion of Western Surety, that appeal
was dismissed by the Utah Supreme Court on March 26, 1987. (See, Order of
Dismissal reproduced infra at A-20.) The unqualified dismissal by Western

%

See% f .n. 3, supra.
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Surety of its appeal constitutes an abandonment of that appeal and results in
what amounts to an affirmance of the order from which the appeal was taken.
Having once dismissed its appeal from the District Court's refusal
to grant its motion to stay proceedings, Western Surety cannot now, more
than five months later, reinstate its appeal.

Western Surety's option was to

pursue its appeal or abandon its appeal — it chose the latter.

Having

abandoned its appeal, and that appeal having been dismissed by the Utah
Supreme Court, Western Surety cannot now resurrect the appeal.

B. Western Surety's Cross-Appeal is Untimely,
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that an
appeal be filed within thirty days of the entry of the challenged order.
In this case, the District Court denied from the bench on December
19, 1986, Western Surety's motion to stay the proceedings and the written
Order was signed and entered on December 13, 1986 (R. at 100, reproduced
infra at A-8).

The April 7, 1987, order resulting from Western Surety's

motion to the District Court to limit execution

H

to the bond" did not in any

way alter, amend, or change the District Court's denial in December of 1986
of Western Surety's motion to stay the proceedings.
limit execution

Likewise, the motion to

H

to the bond" did not seek either expressly or by implication

any amendment or modification of the District Court's December, 1986, denial
of Western Surety's motion to stay the proceedings.

Finally, Western Surety's

acknowledgement that the Order and Judgment dated December 31, 1986, was
a final and appealable order is manifest most clearly by its own appeal of
that Order to the Utah Supreme Court.
18

The mere fact that the District Court's April 7, 1987, Order
granting Western Surety's motion to limit execution "to the bond" stated that
the original December 31, 1986, order granting summary judgment was so
amended and then reiterated

the original order in full, including

the

paragraph denying Western Surety's motion to stay proceedings, does not
revive the time for Western Surety to appeal from the denial of its motion.
Had the District Court in December of 1986 entered two separate orders on
two separate pieces of paper, the untimeliness of Western Surety's crossappeal would be obvious.

Likewise, had the District Court's April 7, 1987,

order merely stated that the original December 31, 1986, judgment was
amended so as to limit execution "to the bond," it would be obvious that
Western Surety's purported cross-appeal is untimely.

Neither the fact that

the denial of a separate motion to stay proceedings was included on the same
piece of paper in December of 1986 as the judgment nor the fact that the
written order in April of 1987 amending the judgment reiterated, for clarity,
the entire operative language of the December, 1986, order and judgment
serves to alter the substantive rights of the parties or extend the appeal
time.
Western Surety's purported cross-appeal is untimely and this Court
lacks jurisdiction of it.

CONCLUSION
Procedurally, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to amend in
April of 1987 its judgment previously entered in December of 1986.

The

District Court had no jurisdiction to correct "clerical mistakes" because
19

Western Surety's appeal from the December, 1986, judgment had been
docketed with the Utah Supreme Court and no leave for such correction had
befen applied for or received from the Utah Supreme Court. The relief sought
by Western Surety did not fall within the purview of Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure because the judgment was not "void" pursuant to
Subsection 5 and no HmistakeH of the nature contemplated by Subsection 1 had
occurred.

The relief that the motion actually sought was a substantive

amendment of the judgment pursuant to Rule 59; however, the motion was
grossly untimely under that rule.
Substantively, there existed no reason or justification to limit the
Bakers' judgment "to the bond."

A bond is merely a civil contract and in

this case Western Surety had breached its contract with the Bakers.
Therefore, it is not appropriate to limit the Bakers' recovery to the contract
that Western Surety had breached.
Western Surety's cross-appeal is barred by the prior dismissal of
the very same appeal by the Utah Supreme Court and because the crossappeal, which relates only to the denial in December of 1986 of Western
Surety's motion for a stay, is untimely.
Accordingly, the District Court's order purporting to amend the
December, 1986, judgment must be vacated and Western Surety's cross-appeal
dismissed. Additionally, the matter should be remanded to the District Court
for the determination and assessment of the reasonable attorney's fees

20

incurred by the Bakers on this appeal, for which Western Surety is
responsible pursuant to the terms of its bond.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <2S? day of August, 1987.
PARKEI
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of August, 1987, I caused

four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to be
mailed, postage prepaid, to:
John N. Braithwaite
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent and
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Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence coilld not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.

A-2

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (l)mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendanthas
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
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Rule 4. Appeal as of right: When taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the district court to the Supreme Court,
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the
district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order
appealed from; provided however, when a judgment or order is entered in a
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court within 10
days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the district court by any party: (1) for
judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the district court by any party:
(1) under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after
judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal
for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or
granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the district court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
Paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the district court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof.
(d) Additional or cross appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
DII which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
f (e) Extension of time to appeal. The district court, upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of
appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the
time prescribed by Paragraph (a j of this rule. Any such motion which is filed
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the district
court otherwise requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in accordance
with the district court rules of practice. No extension shall exceed 30 days past
the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the
motion, whichever occurs later.
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SUPREME COURT OT UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
July 8, 1987
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

John D. Parken
Marcel 3 a L Keck
Attorneys at Law
Suite 1330
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT
84101

George M Baker and Delia M
Baker,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Wo. 870193

u,
Western Surety Company; Craig
A. Papa-Dakls, individually and
d/b/a "Auto-Mart;" and Auto-Mart,
Defendants and Respondents

Pursuant to the the authority uested in this Court, this case
is transferred to the Court of Appeals for disposition.
All further
pleadings and correspondence should be directed to that Court.
Their
address is 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk
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John D. Parken (2518
Marcella L. Keck (4063)
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
Suite 1330, 310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101
Telephone- 521-6383
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
GEORGE M. BAKER and DELLA
A. BAKER,
JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT
Plaintiffs,
v.
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, CRAIG
A. PAPA-DAKIS, individually and
d/b/a "AUTO-MART;" and AUTOMART,

Civil No. C86-7427
The Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson

Defendants.
oooOooo
Defendant in this action, Craig A. Papa-Dakis,
individually and d/b/a "Auto-Mart," having been regularly
served with process, but having failed to appear and answer or
otherwise plead to the complaint on file herein; the legal time
for answers having expired; and the Default of said defendant
having been duly entered according to law; now, upon the motion
of plaintiff, judgment is hereby entered against defendant pursuant to the prayer of the plaintiff's complaint and it is hereby

1

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that plaintiff recover
from Defendants Craig A. Papa-Dakis d/b/a "Auto-Mart" and Auto
Mart the sum of $14,780.00 with interest thereon at the rate of
ten (10) percent per annum and after March 18, 1986, until the
date hereof, in the amount of $935.39, and costs in the amount of
$84.75 for a total of $15,800.14 together with interest at the
rate of twelve (12%) per annum from and after the date herof
until paid.
DATED this

day of November, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

HOWOH*"**

\J.'-J°->l->
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John D. Parken (2518)
Marcella L. Keck (4063)
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
Suite 1330
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
ORDER and SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

GEORGE M. BAKER and DELLA M.
BAKER,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. C86-7427
v.

The Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson

WESTERN SURETY COMPANY; CRAIG
A. PAPA-DAKIS, individually
and d/b/a "AUTO-MART;11 and
AUTO-MART,
Defendants.
oooOooo

Plaintiffs1 Motion to Determine Admissions and Motion
for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing before the
above-entitled Court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding,
at approximately 9:00 o'clock a.m. on Friday, December 19, 1986,
together with Defendant Western Surety Company's Motion to Stay
Proceedings; Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel, John
D. Parken; Defendant Western Surety Company was represented by
its counsel, Mark D. Dunn; the default of Defendants Craig A.

°^oioo

Papa-Dakis and Auto-Mart having heretofore been entered by this
Court, no appearance was entered by or on behalf of Defendants
Papa-Dakis and Auto-Mart; the Court having heard the arguments of
counsel, having reviewed the files and records herein, including
the Affidavits of George Baker and John Braithwaite; Plaintiffs1
counsel having represented that he was not relying in support of
Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment upon any constructive
admissions; the Court being fully advised in the premises; and
good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
1.

Defendant Western Surety Company's motion for a

stay is denied; and
2.

No genuine dispute exists as to any fact material

to the determination of Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment,
and that motion is hereby granted; and it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs be, and
they

are

Surety

hereby,

Company

in

granted
the

judgment

amount

of

against

Defendant

$15,800.14,

Western

together

with

interest at the rate of twelve (12) percent per annum from and
after the date hereof, and together also with Plaintiffs1

2
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costs incurred in this action but with each party to bear their
own counsel fees.
DATED this O ' day of December, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

Homer F. Wilkinson
District Judge

ATTEST
H. QIXON HINDLEY

Approved as to form:
ay

Deputy Ctork

ZoYiri N. Braithwaite
Counsel for Defendant
Western Surety
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of December,
1986, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and
Judgment

to be hand-delivered

to John N. Braithwaite, Esq.,

Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith, 175 South West Temple Suite 650,
Salt Lake City, Utah

84101.
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LED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County, Utah

John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

Deputy'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

'tbk. St\3 N\o 3^3

GEORGE M. BAKER and
DELLA A. BAKER,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

vs.
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY;
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS,
individually and d/b/a
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MART,
an unregistered fictitious name,
Defendants.

Civil No. C86-7427
The Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson

The Motion of Western Surety Company For Relief From
Judgment or, in the alternative, To Limit Execution to the
Interpleaded Funds came on regularly for hearing before this
Court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding, on Friday,
February 13, 1987, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Western Surety
Company appearing by and through its counsel, John N.
Braithwaite, plaintiffs appearing by and through their counsel,
John D. Parken, the Court having reviewed the pleadings on file

#

herein, having reviewed the memoranda supporting and opposing
said motion, having heard and considered the arguments and the
representations of counsel, being fully advised in the premises,
and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of Western Surety
Company for relief from judgment is granted pursuant to Rule
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the reason that
the Order and Summary Judgment previously signed and entered by
this Court on December 31, 1986 was entered by mistake and is
incorrect, and for the reason that said Order and Summary
Judgment is otherwise void.

Relief from judgment is accordingly

granted and the Order and Summary Judgment previously entered is
modified and corrected pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, so as to be entered in its entirety as
follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Western Surety Company's
motion to stay proceedings is denied; and it is hereby
FURTHER ORDERED that no genuine dispute exists as to any
fact material to the determination of plaintiffs1 motion for
summary judgment and plaintiffs are granted summary judgment
against Western Surety Company's bond in the amount of
$15,800.14, together with interest at the rate of twelve (12) per
cent per annum from and after December 31, 1986, and together
with plaintiffs1 costs incurred in this action, but with each

-2-

party to bear their own counsel fees, and it is is hereby
FURTHER ORDERED that the summary judgment awarded to the
plaintiffs is against the bond only, that the plaintiffs are only
entitled to relief against the bond funds, which funds are
deposited in the registry of the Court in the interpleader
action, and that the plaintiffs' relief against the bond funds is
limited as determined by the Court in the interpleader action
filed on December 16, 1986, Civil No. C86-9295; and it is hereby
FURTHER ORDERED that Western Surety Company's liability
is limited to the bond.

DATED thiis

7

day of

^-p^^

, 1987.

BY THE COURT:

ATTEST

-Tv

he Honorable HOMER F. WILKINSON
Third District Court Judge

PPROVED AS TO FORM:

ohn v. Pax
ttornfcy fo

aintiffs
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BOND NO

5816l^bl

B O N D O F M O T O R V E H I C L E DEALER, S A L E S M A N OR C R U S H E R
KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS That we.

Craig

A.

Papa-Dakis

Auto

Hart
of

Street Address
County"'

2540

S a l t

S o u t h Main S t r e e t

L a k e

Salt

City

Utah, as Principal and

Lake

City

WESTERN SURETY COMPANY

a Surety Company qualified and authorized to do business in the State of Utah as Surety are jointly and severally held and
firmly bound to the people of the State of Utah to indemnify persons, firms and corporations for loss suffered by reason of
violation of the conditions hereinafter contained, in the total aggregate annual penal sum of T w e n t y

Thousand

and

Dollars (S 2 0 , 0 0 C H as required by Utah Code Ann §41-3-16(1). (1953, as amended) lawful money of the United States foP c
the payment of which well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, successors and
assigns, jointly, severally and firmly by these presents The total aggregate annual liability of this bond, regardless of the
number of claims, may not exceed < 2 0 . 0 0 0 « 0 0
THE CONDITION OF THIS OBLIGATION IS SUCH. That,
WHEREAS, the above bounden principal has applied for a license to do business as a
Motor v/fthtrift

Dealer

within the State of Utah, and that pursuant to the application, a license has

been or is about to be issued
NOW. THEREFORE, if the above b o u n d e n principal shall obtain said license to do business as such
Motor Vehicle

T ) p a 1 pr

and shall well and truly observe and comply

with all requirements and provisions of THE ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REGULATION AND CONTROL OF THE
BUSINESS OF DEALING IN MOTOR VEHICLES, as provided by Chapter 3, Title 41. Utah Code Ann (1953. as amended),
and indemnify persons, firms and corporations in accordance with Utah Code Ann § 41-3-16(1), (1953, as amended), for loss
suffered by reason of the fraud or fraudulent representations made or through the violation of any of the provisions of said
Motor Vehicle Business Act or any law respecting commerce in motor vehicles, or rule or regulation respecting commerce in
motor vehicles promulgated by a licensing or regulating authority and shall pay judgments and costs adjudged against said
principal so as not to exceed a total aggregate annual liability of S *® tOOO . 0 0

regardless of the number

of claims on this bond on account of fraud or fraudulent representations or for any violation or violations of said laws, rules or
regulations during the time of said license and all lawful renewals thereof, then the above obligation shall be null and void,
otherwise to remain in full force and effect Said bounden principal shall also pay reasonable attorney s fees in cases
successfully prosecuted to judgment.
The Surety herein reserves the right to withdraw as such surety except as to any liability already incurred or accrued
hereunder and may do so upon the giving of written notice of such withdrawal to the principal and to the Motor Vehicle
Business Administrator, provided, however, that no withdrawal shall be effective for any purpose until sixty days shall have
elapsed from and after the receipt of such notice by the said administrator, and further provided that no withdrawal shall in
anywise affect the liability of said surety arising out oi fraud or fraudulent representations or for any violation or violations of
said laws. ru«e3 or regulation by the principal hereunder prior to the expiration of such period of sixty days, regardless of
whether or not the loss suffered has been reduced to judgment before the «apse of sixty days
Signed and sealed this _ 4 t h

day of

February

, 19 8 6

CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS AUTO MART /

/

S

Principal
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY
BY.

.

~>5\

U
($
TZ
K. f > * -

Attorney-i/f-Fact
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TOXT1, I) J\liOfid)

-

I COPY \
wmammmmmmmmKmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmammmttmmmmammj

SALT LAKE COUNTY CLERK
ROOM A.204 • COURTS BUIIOING
240 EAST FOURTH SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

FINES & FORFEITURES

/ ^ v ^ "

B3CDCRs-»a^

tt*t

\ ^

CASE N O .

H. DIXON HINDLSY^CLEI

C3±=32U
STATE O f U T M *
) „
COUNTY OF SALT LAW ) ™
I, T H i UNOIM!QNED, CLEW OF T W DNTCMCT
OOLUT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY.
C«TIFY THAT THE ANNEXED A
A TFUJE AKO FULL COW OF AH
MSNTf ON
UN FILE
F f L l If*
If* MY
MY OflFrOpE
OfTrOfE i
WITNf"
'
'
TVW.
KDWONI H W
^ (
BY
Y V ^
Y\ /! W
:^==TtlEPUTY

A.>.

rj
^

JAN-51387^-.!

$V

/>>,

i.T'V -'

o

6/L

06JA87
0
1

03:46
56338.002
752971810
869295
$20t000.00

GOQIS 2

A
D
T

STATE OF UTAH
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT

NORMAN H. BANGERTER
Governor

HAROLD C. YANCEY
Insurance Commissioner

160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45803
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Phone: (801)530-6400

CERTIFIED MAIL

January

27,

1987

Western Surety Company
101 South Phillips
Avenue
Sioux Falls,
SD 57192
Attention:
RE:
Dear Mr.

Joe Patrick
Our File

No.

Kirby,

President

22101

Kirby:

On January 13, 1987 the above referred
to file
was opened
pursuant
to a complaint
filed
with the Department
alleging
that
Western
Surety has failed
to satisfy
an existing
judgment entered
in the
Third District
Court in the State of Utah, Salt Lake County
(Civil
No. C86-7427).
The complaint
was forwarded
to Western
Surety
Company on or about January 16, 1987 and we are awaiting
the
company's response.
However, an additional
matter has come to the
attention
of the Commissioner which causes this correspondence
to
be forwarded to you.
The judgment at issue in this matter was entered
on December 30,
1986.
It was the understanding
of counsel
for the plaintiff
in
those proceedings
that Western Surety
would not voluntarily
pay
the judgment.
While we understand
that Western Surety has the
right
of appeal,
it was also
the understanding
of
plaintiff's
counsel
that Western Surety
would not appeal.
Accordingly,
if
that is the fact,
then Western Surety
is obliged
to satisfy
the
judgment.
The Commissioner views this matter with much concern.
Because of
the position
taken by Western Surety,
through its counsel in Salt
Lake City,
plaintiff
has been forced to seek the enforcement
and
satisfaction
of the judgment
through a massive
garnishment
of
Western Surety
Company agents doing business
in this state.
The
garnishment
has been issued
to approximately
twenty
(20)
agents
and will
continue
until
the judgment
is satisfied.
We have
received
complaints
from agents,
who were not parties
to
the
lawsuit,
concerning
the garnishment
of their trust account
funds.
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-2It is the position
of the Commissioner
that
Western
Surety
must
satisfy
the judgment
and not allow
the continued
garnishment
of
its
agents
in this
state.
We view the matter
of the
outstanding
garnishment
procedures
to be totally
unnecessary.
Furthermore,
Utah insureds
may be placed
in a perilous
position
under
the
garnishment
of funds intended
as premium for
coverage.
Under
the
Utah
Insurance
Code,
Section
31A-2-308(ll),
the
Commissioner
may revoke
the
Certificate
of
Authority
of
any
licensee
whose methods
and practices
he finds
would endanger
the
legitimate
interest
of customers
and the public.
In light
of
that
provision,
the conduct
of Western
Surety
in failing
to satisfy
an
outstanding
judgment
would,
in the opinion
of the
Commissioner,
place
the Certificate
of Authority
of the company in jeopardy
in
this
state.
The Commissioner
cannot
find good cause,
under
these
facts,
for Western
Surety
to allow
a garnishment
of its
agents,
which
may jeopardize
policyholders
as well
as
the
legitimate
interests
of the public.
Subject
to Western
Surety's
right
of
appeal
of
the
judgment
that
is
currently
outstanding,
the
Commissioner
demands
that
Western
Surety
honor
the judgment
and
satisfy
it in full.
Should
the company decide
not to appeal
the
judgment
and not satisfy
it,
the Commissioner
will
file
a
Notice
of Hearing
and Order
to Show Cause and consider
all
appropriate
penalties
in enforcement
of the Insurance
Code.
Your
cooperation
in
attendance
to
this
matter
is
greatly
appreciated.
The Commissioner
expects
the
written
response
of
Western
Surety
within
ten
(10)
days
of
receipt
of
this
correspondence.
Sincerely,
HAROLD C. YANCEY, CPCU
Insurance

Kendall
Market
KRS:lm
1105L

Commissioner

R. Surfass
/
Conduct Sta^x Counsel
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John N. Braithwaiter Bar No. 4544
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE M. BAKER and
DELLA A. BAKER,
Plaintiffs,
NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY;
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS,
individually and d/b/a
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MART,
an unregistered fictitious name,
Defendants.

Civil No. C86-7427
The Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson

Western Surety Company, by and through its counsel,
hereby gives notice of its appeal from a part of that certain
order entered on December 31, 1986 by the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County in the above entitled action.
The part of the order appealed from is the order denying Western
Surety Companyfs motion to stay proceedings, which denial allowed
the subsequent grant of summary judgment exposing Western Surety
Company to multiple liability.

This appeal seeks a reversal of

OJG153

the denial of the motion to stay proceedings and accordingly,
seeks the vacation of the summary judgment entered subsequent to
the denial of the motion to stay proceedings.

This appeal is

taken to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
DATED this

2 * ? ^ day of January, 1987.
HANSON, DONN, EPPERSON & SMITH

^ ^/M7M<^{L

JOJflTN. BRAITHWAITE
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, this
T/t/iotiry

U^

clay of

r 1987, to the following:

John D. Parken
Marcella L. Keck
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, OT 84101
Craig A. Papa-Dakis
1630 South Main
Salt Lake City, UT 84115

(Itffcn $> DA^iM^jt/

9/86-600D.14
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John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE M. BAKER and
DELLA A. BAKER,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs.
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY;
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS,
individually and d/b/a
"AUTO-MART11; and AUTO-MART,
an unregistered fictitious name.

Case No. 870059
District Court
Civil No. C86-7427

Defendant/Appellant.
Based upon the stipulation of the parties and the motion
of the appellant Western Surety Company for the dismissal of this
appeal, and pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-referenced appeal is
dismissed.
•&

DATED this

day of March, 1987.
BY TBE SUPREME COURT:

r

CERTIFICATE OF SEKVTGB

I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, this
day of

/fyw-ok

, 1987, to the following:

John D . Parken
Marce11a L. Keck
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

4^vT ''•
1/86-743M.1
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John D. Parken (2518)
Marcella L. Keck (4063)
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
Suite 1330
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383

<P
np' *j\
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DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

i>

oooOooo
NOTICE OF APPEAL

GEORGE M. BAKER and DELIA M.
BAKER,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. C86-7427

WESTERN SURETY COMPANY; CRAIG
A. PAPA-DAKIS, individually
and d/b/a "AUTO-MART;" and
AUTO-MART,

The Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson

Defendants.
oooOooo
Plaintiffs, by

and

through

their

counsel, John D.

Parken, hereby appeal, to the Utah Supreme Court, from the Order
of the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson granting Defendant Western
Surety Company's Motion, in the Alternative, for Relief from
Judgment

or

to

Limit

Execution

and

amending

the

Judgment

previously entered by the District Court on December 31, 1986.

t.i

v

This appeal is only from the Order, signed April 7, 1987, and not
from the original Judgment, signed December 31, 1986.
DATED this
i s/Krf
^t day of April, 1987.
John D,

CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

ILING

4

day of April, 1987, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal
to be mailed, postage prepaid to the following:
John N. Braithwaite, Esq.
Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith
175 South West Temple Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

^

y

THE COURT:

That should be resolved by Judge

Wilkinson now, not by me.
MR. BRAITHWAITE:
Surety

The motion against Western

upon the bond liability, pursuant to the statute,

31-4-18, only upon the bond.
THE COURT:

That question I think, Mr. Braithwait^

you have got to approach with Judge Wilkinson.

That's his

law suit. He tried that case. You're asking me now to
make a ruling about whether that judgment can be executed
could be satisfied and that is not in this case.

[

It proper4

-ly shouldn't be a part of this case. That should be a partj
of the case with Judge Wilkinson;so I frankly think that to
the extent—well, I frankly think the order was wrongfully
issued and I am

going to dissolve the temporary restraining

order.
Now, that does not make
to be a ruling as to

any ruling and not intended

whether or not the Baker judgment has

priority against this fund,• but I am not going to, in this
action, stay the execution of that judgment and if they want]
to go try and execute anyplace they want to, such defenses
as may be available to those executions can be raised;but
they'll have to be raised in that case.
Now, if they execute against the fund here, that will)
clearly raise the question of the priority that we're drivirjg
at here.

But everybody is entitled to be heard on that, not

just the people who are here today.

So that in the event tqe

execution is made as aginst the County Attorney's Office
39
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John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE M. BAKER a n d
DELLA A . BAKER,

Plaintiffs,
vs,
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY;
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS,
individually and d/b/a
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MART,
an unregistered fictitious name,
Defendants.

STIPULATION AND MOTION
TO APPROVE SUPERSEDEAS
BOND

Civil No. C86-7427
The Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson

STIPULATION
Western Surety Company, by and through its counsel, John
N. Braithwaite, and George M. and Delia A. Baker, by and through
their counsel, John D. Parken, hereby stipulate and agree as
follows:
1.

That Western Surety Company may post a supersedeas

bond in the amount of $18,000, pursuant to Rule 62 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and pursuant to the appeal taken by
Western Surety Company.

4(*

Cl

2.

That pursuant to Rule 62(d) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, a stay of execution or other proceedings to
enforce the judgment entered in this matter will be in effect
upon the approval by the Court of the supersedeas bond
stipulated.
3.

That despite the existence of the stay, George M.

and Delia A. Baker shall be entitled to participate in the
interpleader action currently pending before this Court in the
matter styled Western Surety Company v. Robert Benson, et al.,
Civil No. C86-9295, wherein the motor vehicle dealer bond funds
that are the subject matter of this action have been deposited.
4.

That despite the existence of the stay, George M.

and Delia A. Baker shall be entitled to seek satisfaction of the
judgment entered in this action by participating in the
interpleader action and by executing upon their judgment within
the interpleader action. Civil No. C86-9295, to the extent deemed
appropriate by the Court.
DATED this

/2&

day of February, 1987.

Qf4^ V- &4/tM^#iis

JOBft'N. BRAITHWAITE
Attorney for Western Surety Co.
DATED thiis

A

*y

day of

eorge & Delia Baker
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John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE M. BAKER and
DELLA A. BAKER,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY;
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS,
individually and d/b/a
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MART,
an unregistered fictitious name,
Defendants.

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, TO LIMIT
EXECUTION TO THE
INTERPLEADED FUNDS
Civil No. C86-7427
The Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson

Western Surety Company hereby moves the above entitled
Court to correct the judgment entered in this matter on December
31, 1986, pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure or, in the alternative, to modify the judgment enteredf
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The

grounds for this motion are as follows:
(1)

Judgment was entered by this Court on December 31,

1986 on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against
Western Surety Company on its motor vehicle dealer's bond.

G00161
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(2)

Prior to the entry of the judgment and prior to the

hearing on the motion for summary judgment held on December 1 9 ,
1986, Western Surety Company filed a complaint for interpleader
on December 16 f 1986, interpleading the bond amount and the
numerous claimants to the bond in the matter styled Western
Surety Company v. Robert Benson, et al., Civil No. C86-9295.
(3)

By the filing of the interpleader action,

interpleader jurisdiction was established over the $20,000 bond
held by Western Surety Company.
(4)

The plaintiffs in this matter are now attempting to

execute upon their judgment against the assets of Western Surety
Company generally, rather than against the bond funds held in the
interpleader action.
(5)

Western Surety Company's liability is limited to

the $20,000 bond on an aggregate annual basisf regardless of the
number of claimsf and the plaintiffs must satisfy their judgment
against the bond funds.
(6)

The plaintiffs claim that their judgment entitles

them to execute upon the assets of Western Surety Company
generally, and that they are not required to satisfy their
judgment out of the bond funds.
(7)

To the extent that the Order entered by this Court

allows the plaintiffs to execute upon Western Surety Company
assets generally to satisfy their judgment, the Order is in

error, as the plaintifffs judgment should be limited to a
judgment against the bond.

This Court may, pursuant to Rule

60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, correct errors in
judgments and orders arising from oversight or omission on the
motion of any party.

The only right of action that the

plaintiffs had against Western Surety Company was upon the bond,
pursuant to Otah Code Ann. §41-3-18. Western Surety Company*s
liability arises only by reason of the bond, and the plaintiffs1
notion for summary judgment was based upon and against the bond.
Accordingly, the judgment should be corrected to reflect that the
judgment is against Western Surety Company^ bond and must be
satisfied out of that bond.
(8) Alternatively, this Court may, pursuant to Rule
50(b), modify the judgment entered to accurately reflect the
result of its judgment.

Specifically, subdivision (1) provides

Eor relief from orders or judgments for reasons of mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

To the extent that

the Order entered by this Court allows the plaintiffs to execute
jpon Western Surety Company assets generally to satisfy their
judgment, the Order does not accurately reflect the result of the
summary judgment entered.

The only cause of action the

plaintiffs had against Western Surety Company was against the
Dond, pursuant to U.C.A. §41-3-18. Western Surety Company's
Liability arises only by reason of the bond and its liability is

000163
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limited by the bond.

Accordingly, the judgment entered should be

modified to accurately reflect the result of the summary
judgment.
Alternatively, Western Surety moves this Court for an
Order limiting execution upon the judgment entered in this action
on December 31, 1986 to the bond funds being held in the
interpleader action currently pending in the matter styled
Western Surety Company v. Robert Benson, et al., Civil No.
C86-9295.

The grounds for this motion are set forth in the

foregoing paragraphs.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^^

day of February, 1987.

HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
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